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Kim: The Republic of Korea’s Counter-asymmetric Strategy

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA’S COUNTER-ASYMMETRIC
STR ATEGY
Lessons from ROKS Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island
Captain Duk-Ki Kim, Republic of Korea Navy

S

ince its provocations against Yeonpyeong Island on 23 November 2010, North
Korea’s asymmetric threats have emerged as one of the most momentous security issues for the Republic of Korea (ROK).1 After bitter defeats in the First
and Second Yeonpyeong Sea Battles, as well as in the Daechung Sea Battle of November 2009, North Korea recognized its disadvantage in symmetric surface-ship
provocations. It resorted instead to new and unexpected tactics, utilizing its latest
small submarine to torpedo ROKS Cheonan on 26 March 2010.
Considered to be the North’s severest military provocation since the Korean War armistice, the sinking of ROKS Cheonan gravely shocked every aspect of Korean society—political, diplomatic, psychological, and military—and
caused deep ripples across the range of Northeast
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The problem that besets the Korean Peninsula lies in the unavoidable fact that
the ROK’s vulnerability has increased as North Korea’s asymmetric threat has expanded and diversified. The current threat is a conventional weapon–based war
capability that includes chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) weapons,
long-range artillery (LRA), special operations units, and underground tunnels.
However, it is rapidly expanding to one of nuclear and high-technology weaponry (e.g., cyberwarfare, electronic warfare, hovercraft, and air-cushion stealth
warships).2 When these separate asymmetric assets are combined, the North’s
capabilities and military options will be greatly strengthened. They will pose a
serious threat to the ROK military, because they can be used both as core means
of attack during wartime and for localized provocations in peacetime.
The ROK is currently facing the difficult question of how to cope with the
development of these asymmetric capabilities. Based on lessons it learned from
these most recent attacks, the ROK has focused on not only reshaping its military
strategies but also strengthening its capabilities to deal with the North’s asymmetric threats and enhancing “jointness” (합동성) among its services.
The strategic challenge posed by an asymmetric strategy concerns the relationship between the weak/poor and strong/wealthy. Regardless of how strong and
wealthy a state is, if it fails to comprehend the strengths of the weak and poor, it
is destined to fail. Asymmetric solutions of “yisojaedae” (以小制大, “conquering
large forces with small ones”) always exist, enabling the weak and poor to exploit
vulnerabilities of the strong and wealthy. The former can undermine and debilitate the latter’s military superiority by means of a diplomatic strategy that capitalizes on that very superiority through “yiyijaeyi” (以夷制夷, “using the enemy
against itself ”). Globalization and networking have been pillars of strength for
the strong/wealthy, but they offer opportunities against them for the weak/poor;
weaknesses within globalization and networking can be cleverly used to nullify
the strengths of their intended beneficiaries. Finally, though major twenty-firstcentury militaries have been revolutionized by information technology, their new
capabilities for battlefield awareness, information sharing, and long-range precision strikes are ineffective against irregular and guerrilla warfare, subversion, and
destabilization.
To explore these issues in some detail, this article will analyze the North’s
asymmetric threat from various dimensions and propose counter-asymmetric
concepts and strategies for the South.
A NEW ASYMMETRIC THREAT FROM NORTH KOREA
North Korea was one of the early exponents of asymmetric warfare. Combining Soviet conventional doctrine (operations by mechanized units in the enemy’s
depth) and Mao Zedong’s concepts of irregular struggle (People’s War, guerrilla
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss1/4

5950_Kim.indd 56

2

12/5/2011 11:30:38 AM

Kim: The Republic of Korea’s Counter-asymmetric Strategy

KIM

57

and political-psychological warfare), the North has developed a bold form of
combined regular/irregular warfare for the purpose of rapidly conquering the
South, before U.S. reinforcements can be deployed on the peninsula. The North’s
methods emphasize the speed of regular warfare but at the same time recognize
its limitations.
Background and Development
Having observed the ineffectiveness of America’s high-tech forces in Vietnam,
Pyongyang aspired to re-create Vietnam and its armed unification on the Korean
Peninsula. It drastically increased its military in 1970 and greatly improved its
conventional and asymmetric capabilities. The latter included tunnels, which allow the North to infiltrate the Demilitarized Zone.
The end of the Cold War, the ROK’s creation of diplomatic ties with Russia and
China, an increasing gap in national power, the death of Kim Il-sung, and its own
deteriorating economy, along with other foreign and domestic issues in the 1990s,
led North Korea to enhance its capabilities for asymmetric warfare as its new survival strategy. At a political level, the North adopted the concept of “kangsung
daeguk” (강성대국, “strong and properous nation”) and the “sungun jeungchi”
(선군정치, “military-first politics”). At the military level it brought out nuclear
weapons, missiles, and threats to envelop Seoul in flames. The North has actively
played its political cards to realize its military goals, and despite numerous difficulties, it has done so successfully. The nation has staged a continuous series of
armed demonstrations: launching a long-range ballistic missile on 5 April 2009,
conducting a second nuclear test on 25 May that year, initiating a distributeddenial-of-service (DDOS) cyber attack on 7 July 2009, and firing short-ranged
missiles on several occasions. Later the North changed its strategy to one of “miso”
(미소, “little smile,” a false suggestion of reconciliation), but receiving only a
meager response from the ROK, decided to make a new move, torpedoing ROKS
Cheonan on 26 March 2010, killing forty-six crew members, and bombarding
the inhabited island of Yeonpyeong on 23 November, killing four people. Experts
believe that this series of provocations was initiated on the basis of its confidence
in the development and possession of nuclear weapons.
A Hypothetical Scenario: Mixed and Full-Scale Warfare
As a countermeasure to North Korea’s asymmetric strategies, the South has focused
on nurturing an elite army of superior quality and strengthening the ROK-U.S.
Joint Defense System and Rear Integrated Defense System. Meanwhile, the North
has continuously developed new asymmetric threats that include nuclear and CBR
weapons, missiles, LRA, special operations units, cyber weapons, electromagnetic
pulse (EMP) weapons, Global Positioning System (GPS)–disturbance devices, submarines and minisubs, and online political and psychological warfare.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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For limited provocations the North will apply these tactics, separately or combined, to a modest degree, but in the case of full-scale war we expect it to employ
its assets fully through integration, combination, and mixing. The speed, pressure, shock, scale, and intensity of destruction would be immense.3
It is expected that the North Korean regime will first conduct a simultaneous
and multifarious cyber offensive on the Republic of Korea’s society and basic infrastructure, government agencies, and major military command centers while at
the same time suppressing the ROK government and its domestic allies and supporters with nuclear weapons. If the North succeeds in developing and deploying
its EMP weapons, it will be able to paralyze electronic functions as well. Moreover, the North will launch an offensive with its diverse collection of missiles
(including the recently developed KN-01 and KN-02) and long-range artillery
against the strategic center of the ROK, inflicting terror and realizing its threats
to make Seoul an ocean of flames.
The North Korean regime will conduct a rapid front-and-rear combined operation to seize and conquer the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area while carefully
monitoring the ROK’s and international community’s response. Furthermore, it
will infiltrate the South by deploying special operations units by land, sea, and air
in multiple ways not only to disturb and disperse ROK forces but also to conquer
Seoul and use it for bargaining leverage. Should the South decline its terms, the
North will immediately expand its operations to sweep and conquer the entire
nation, seeking to do so before U.S. reinforcements arrive. At this point North
Korean forces will not be greatly concerned with logistic support, since they expect to be able to use the South’s resources, especially in Greater Seoul.
Even if the North’s invasion operation does not progress as planned and encounters a ROK-U.S. counteroffensive, North Korea has no reason to be pessimistic, since it expects the South to accept an armistice immediately if threatened
by nuclear missiles. In fact, it will be difficult for the United States to intervene
actively at all should the North threaten nuclear employment. Moreover, North
Korea calculates that against a backdrop of nuclear threats, pro-North leftists in
South Korean society will stir anti-American sentiments, warning of nuclear attacks if the United States intervenes. When the Northern regime initially declares
war, these parties may create a dangerous possibility of proactive sympathizing
forces emerging within South Korean society.
Although this hypothetical scenario is gravely pessimistic, it is neither ungrounded nor irrelevant. From the perspective of preparing for the worst, it is
crucial that the South increase interest in how to counter not only combined and
full-scale campaigns but also separate, fragmented, and local asymmetric threats.
Hubris and overconfidence represent serious risks for the Republic of Korea.
Seoul must not underestimate the strength of Pyongyang’s military just because
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss1/4
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of its own absolute economic superiority. Moreover, we must not disparage
North Korean soldiers and surmise that they lack combat abilities merely because
their country is poor and small, uses ageing and obsolete weapons, and lacks sustainment capabilities. In addition to its variety of asymmetric assets and employment methods, North Korea has been analyzing lessons from the 2003 Iraq war,
instructing its people in firearms and suicide bombing, and indoctrinating them
in the idea of defending the “great leader” with their lives and in an ideology that
combines these concepts.
THE ROK’S COUNTER-ASYMMETRIC STRATEGIES: ANALYSIS
The South’s overall national power currently surpasses that of the North. Although the North’s territory is about twenty thousand square kilometers larger
than the South’s, the population of the South is nearly double that of the North,
and its economic strength is about thirty times superior. Furthermore, the
South’s foundational regime and governing system are far better than those of the
North. Whereas the South has pursued a liberal democracy, a market economy,
and a social welfare system, the North has maintained a communist dictatorship,
a hereditary regime, and national militarization based on “kangsung daeguk,”
“sungun” (선군), and “juche” (주체).4 While the South has established neighborly relationships with other nations around the world, acting as befits a major
economic power and serving as host of a Group of Twenty 2010 summit, the
Northern regime has been criticized and isolated for its development of nuclear
weapons, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), counterfeiting
of U.S. dollars, trafficking in drugs, smuggling, and other internationally outlawed activities.
At the military level, despite the fact that the South’s military spending is between a tenth and fifteenth of the North’s as a percentage of its gross domestic
product, the ROK military’s actual size surpasses the North’s by approximately
four times. The ROK has been developing a force of superior quality, whereas
North Korea has been nurturing quantitative superiority. An overall comparative assessment of asymmetric quality and quantity shows that the two sides are
roughly equivalent. The ROK is weaker with regard to field artillery and submarines but maintains similar levels in tanks, surface warships, and fighter jets.
Furthermore, the South has continuously developed its quality-based capabilities
in network-centric warfare (NCW), whereas the North has focused on nuclear
weapons and other WMDs.5 Where the South has concentrated on deterrence
and proactive-defense through combined ROK-U.S. forces, the North has pursued preemptive surprise-attack and lightning-war strategies. The ROK forces
are controlled by the people and operate under an integrated system. The North’s
military lacks comparable training opportunities due to the nation’s deteriorating
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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economy, but it has been told that long-term service and “sungun” military-first
policies have kept individual training levels high.6
The South’s counter-asymmetric strategies can be subjected to “SWOT analysis,” a tool that—focusing on strength, weakness, opportunity, and threat—is
widely used for future planning by corporations. From this perspective, North
Korea’s greatest weakness lies in its internal inconsistency stemming from economic problems (insufficient food, energy, and foreign currency reserves), a
hereditary dictatorship, and the “sungun” policy. In its current system, market
competition is impossible, and there is a growing likelihood of implosion were
it to open its economy to the world. Accordingly, the North Korean regime has
exploited Greater Seoul’s proximity to the armistice line to hold it hostage to
nuclear blackmail and so strategically counterbalance its weaknesses all at once.
It is crucial that South Korea take into consideration the two main aspects—
conventional and irregular—of the North’s asymmetric strategies and develop
proper responses to them. The ROK’s national power is superior to that of the
North. The ROK must utilize this crucial asset by achieving the status of an advanced military power, through human and hardware reserves, while not excessively burdening the people. This will achieve deterrence at low cost. The ROK
must also heighten and strengthen the ROK-U.S. relationship into a comprehensive security alliance. Cooperation with China is essential, but not at the cost of
damaging the U.S. alliance. Lastly, the ROK must maintain friendly relations with
neighboring powers (especially China), promoting a favorable environment for
ROK-led deterrence and reunification.
Active protection of Greater Seoul from North Korean WMDs is difficult due
to its proximity to the front line. Therefore, the ROK must be able to prevent and
deter North Korean WMD threats by means of its high-tech NCW assets. First,
taking advantage of its budgetary and technological capacity, the South must secure asymmetry in long-distance, detailed surveillance and reconnaissance as well
as in multilevel missile defense. Second, the ROK must transform Greater Seoul’s
locational weakness into a strength, by nurturing and developing its mobile reserve forces (especially assets already in the area) along with standing forces, under a “total force” concept. Third, with nuclear, intelligence, and missile-defense
support from the United States and relying on a solid alliance, the South must
build, maintain, and operate an independent, superior, and high-tech military.
Finally, the South would do well to reconsider how it rotates high military
officials on a two-year cycle. Although an excellent system in terms of work, this
two-year cycle is simply too short to allow officials to contrive innovative ideas
of asymmetry, and it results in a lack of professional knowledge and motivation.
The North, in contrast, maintains a long-term-service system, relying on a small
number of skilled military elites.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss1/4

5950_Kim.indd 60

6

12/5/2011 11:30:39 AM

Kim: The Republic of Korea’s Counter-asymmetric Strategy

KIM

61

TABLE 1
MAJOR NORTH KOREAN ASYMMETRIC THREATS
Category
Core

Major

Mixed

Threat

Intensity

Frequency

Nuclear blackmail, hostage threats

A

B

Threats to turn Seoul into sea of flames

A

B

Threats on Five West Sea Islands

A

A

Rear disturbance, infiltration threats

B

B

Cyber-attack threats (DDOS, etc.)

C

A

Electromagnetic-attack threats

C

B

Political-psychological offensive threats

C

A

Symmetric-asymmetric mixed-attack threats

A

D

Note: A = high; B = medium; C = low; D = very low.

DIRECTIONS FOR ROK COUNTER-ASYMMETRIC STRATEGIES
Seoul has adopted a “proactive deterrence strategy” to replace the previous passive and defensive-oriented strategy, which was shown to be ineffective by the
two deadly attacks of 2010.7 Table 1 summarizes, in order of importance, the
major North Korean asymmetric threats, including recent ones—nuclear, missile, and high-tech assets (cyber- and electronic-warfare units, air-cushion stealth
warships, etc.).
Responses to Nuclear and Missile Threats
The North’s nuclear and missile assets are expected to increase, in both performance and quantity, and to be used to maximize strategic superiority.8 The
South’s counter-asymmetry response is to rely on extended deterrence by the
United States while independently pursuing a four-stage nonnuclear deterrence
strategy (surveillance/reconnaissance, precision strike, interception, protection)
based on high-tech network-centric warfare. Because the political and psychological shock of nuclear weapons is substantial, “nuclear versus nuclear” deterrence is accepted relatively easily but concepts of nonnuclear deterrence through
technology seem hollow and ineffective. However, conventional, high-tech NCW
has the potential for precise destruction of the enemy’s nuclear weapons and missiles before they are fired and for their rapid and accurate interception in flight.
First, we assess the feasibility of the former—offensive deterrence through
network-centric assets. If the South secures a sufficient variety of NCW assets at a
strategic level, it will be able to conduct simultaneous strikes on nuclear and missile facilities and other centers of gravity in parallel with “deep” decapitating and
surgical strikes. The effects of such attacks in the Iraq war have been compared to
those of nuclear weapons. Preemptive strikes in self-defense must be fully considered, since even one nuclear missile attack will have catastrophic consequences. It
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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is up to surveillance and reconnaissance assets to determine whether indications
of nuclear missile strike are sufficient to the nation and its leaders to gain legal
recognition of preemptive strikes as legitimate self-defense.
To implement an offensive deterrence strategy based on high-tech NCW, the
ROK must first, at a joint level, design and gradually construct, improve, and expand a system of platforms (satellites, aircraft, manned and unmanned aerial vehicles), high-resolution sensors (electro-optical, infrared, synthetic aperture radar), and missiles (ballistic, cruise, and long-range precision-guided). Second, it
must construct a fast and accurate command-and-control network and minimize
decision-making time. Third, in the longer term, it must pioneer development
of such innovative approaches as directed energy, nonfatal, and robot weapons.9
The ROK must also reevaluate the current ROK-U.S. missile agreement with regard to range and payload, increase efforts toward the agreement’s modification
and supplementation, and expand national defense research and development
(R&D), in order to select, concentrate on, and amass relevant core technology.
To make feasible the latter defensive aspect of deterrence, the South must initiate a complex Korean missile-defense system. At the national defense level, it is
vital that the South reexamine and redesign its missile-defense architecture, and
at the joint level conduct—and, vitally, institutionalize—a three-dimensional
assessment of its current programs. At the ROK-U.S. level, optimization of the
missile-defense system, excellence in command and control, and intimate connection with regional American missile defenses are imperative.
It is important that the ROK take note of the Israeli missile-defense experience. The United States, with its expeditionary forces deployed around the world,
has been developing its missile-defense system based on three major axes, for
ground-based, sea-based, and air-based interception. Israel, in contrast, has been
formulating and developing systems for short-range rocket defense (Iron Dome),
lower-tier missile defense, and upper-tier defense (Arrow-2, Arrow-3/Block-2, -3,
-4). This multilevel Israeli defense system is centered on a single axis (ground), as
best suited to its local forces and as the most economically feasible option.
In terms of hardware, the core asymmetry between the North and South today
is one of network-centric warfare versus weapons of mass destruction, and at
its center lies competition in technological development. Therefore, in order to
secure a strategic, long-range NCW system, the South needs to foster nationaldefense R&D, committing itself to the accumulation of core technology. Furthermore, it must construct a cooperative relationship between the people and the
military at a national level.
Responses to Long-Range Artillery and Conventional Missile Threats
The Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area is the heart of the South; its population
density is high, and over 70 percent of the nation’s wealth is concentrated there.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss1/4
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Meanwhile, military experts assume that the North, while threatening to turn the
city into a sea of flames, will in fact attempt to solve its weaknesses in sustainment capabilities by seizing Greater Seoul early on so as to utilize its human and
physical resources.
As a matter of defensive deterrence, the ROK must reevaluate and enhance
its counterfirepower capabilities in three dimensions. North Korea not only has
recently moved its LRA to reverse slopes and concealed it in camouflaged tunnels
but has also continued development and production of KN-01/02 short-range
missiles.10 The ROK must be able to strike LRA batteries within ten minutes after
they emerge for firing and restrike until they retreat back to their tunnels. Hence,
further decreases in the time required for the battle cycle (target identification,
command and control, precision strike) at a joint level are unavoidable.
In terms of offensive deterrence, the ROK must secure capabilities to launch
precision strikes against Pyongyang in response to threats to Seoul. Although the
range of conventional weapons in the past was insufficient, Seoul is now able to
acquire large quantities of various guided weapons that can reach Pyongyang.
With such weapons, it can develop effective, simultaneous, and integrated tactics
for parallel warfare tactics and decapitation directly threatening the Pyongyang
national command. Pyongyang strike assets were once categorized as strategic;
now they have become tactical. The relative geographical distances of Seoul and
Pyongyang from the armistice line have been made irrelevant by long-range
weapon systems.
A proactive defensive readiness posture that combines the above defensive and
offensive deterrent measures is urgently needed.11 As the South’s population has
increasingly become concentrated in Seoul, the city’s strategic value has grown.
The people, for whom the value of life and property has increased in proportion
to the nation’s economic and social development, demand the strengthening of
national security.12 Further, Greater Seoul has recently expanded northward; the
distance from the demilitarized zone has decreased from between thirty and forty
kilometers to between fifteen and twenty, and this trend is expected to continue
in the future. This newly urbanized region was originally an operation area for
frontal corps; it has become imperative that these units hold the current front
without conceding territory.13
In order to achieve a state of proactive defense readiness, the ROK must be
able to manage Greater Seoul’s resources in multidimensional respects. Otherwise it will be merely a burden and obstacle for ROK forces and a crucial strategic
resource for the North Koreans. The South must convert Greater Seoul’s proximity to the front line from an asymmetric weakness into a strategic advantage by
organizing and husbanding its human and material resources so that they can
be, when necessary, rapidly converted into powerful, forward-deployed combat
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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units. Therefore, South Korea must implement a rapid Greater Seoul mobilization plan that, while minimizing the burden on the people, can nevertheless be
activated in case of imminent threats. It is important that the ROK review its current reserve-force and industrial mobilization programs and bring them to levels
matching those of the United States and Israel.
Responses to Threats to the “Five West Sea Islands”
The North’s recent provocations against Yeonpyeong Island demonstrated how
vulnerable the Five West Sea Islands are. In fact, however, the Five West Sea Islands
represent a geographic asymmetric disadvantage for the North, which hence may
consider them a serious strategic threat.14 In fact, the South, by positioning forces
forwardly on the islands and in the surrounding waters, can, during peacetime,
impose a strategic blockade (serving to protect Greater Seoul) around the coasts
of Hwanghae Province (one of the nearest land provinces from the Northern
Limit Line [NLL] in North Korea). In wartime, the South can prevent sudden infiltration of Greater Seoul through the coastal region and can also strike western
North Korea. Military strategists anticipate that the North will continue to monitor the strategic situation on the Korean Peninsula and contrive new methods
to offset the NLL. At the current stage, thorough preparation and defense of the
West Sea NLL and the Five Islands—the front lines
NLL AND THE FIVE WEST SEA ISLANDS
of the Republic of Korea—are urgent.
First, defensive deterrence against provocations is necessary. The North has continued to
devise various provocation and threat scenarios,
China
identifying its own weaknesses in each relevant
factor (operational doctrine, organization, leadership, education, training, logistics, etc.) through
North

simulation exercises and establishing specific reKorea
sponses for every possible situation. ROK forces
NLL
must strengthen and demonstrate proportionate
႔ Pyongyang

NLL
႔ Seoul

NLL

South
Korea Baekryong Island
Daechung Island
Sochung Island
* NLL: Northern Limit Line
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retaliatory capabilities in order to deter North Korean provocations effectively.
It appears that the North will now reduce provocations against vessels at sea,
but the South must remain vigilant as intelligence shows the North’s ambition
of developing and deploying, in collaboration with Iran, new “patrol killer” craft
and submarines equipped with stealth technology. Seoul expects further provocations using submarines and remains highly sensitive to mixed provocations,
such as those from both artillery and antiship/land-attack missiles. Therefore, a
thorough review of naval and marine forces required for proportional retaliation
against various types of provocations from the North is necessary at a joint level,
along with accurate forecasting.15 With regard to the possibility of the North developing stealth patrol killers and small submarines, the need for further R&D is
urgent.
Next, with respect to provocation deterrence, it is necessary to develop and
examine scenarios requiring various types of proportional retaliation, assessing
whether the ROK should not respond in certain situations, so as to avoid escalation, while at the same time providing active support, and to accumulate “combat”
experience through simulation exercises. Furthermore, the ROK must consider hypothetical situations in which the North provokes the South with a combination
of various methods, and the ROK must also prepare for proportional retaliation
along valid lines of self-defense.
Additionally, the South should also examine deterrence measures against offensive actions—that is, more serious provocations. The Five West Sea Islands
are highly vulnerable now, but should the South convert them into unconquerable fortresses, their vulnerability could become a strategic advantage due to their
closeness to the North. Baekryong Island, from the North’s perspective, is similar
to Taiwan’s Jinmen Daeo (Quemoy Island) (金門島) in China’s eyes in the years of
tension and confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. Jinmen’s strategic value has long
since disspiated, but Baekryong, the ROK’s eighth-largest island and the country’s northernmost territory, 180 kilometers from Incheon City, lies only twentynine kilometers from North Korea’s Hwanghae Province and 150 kilometers
from Pyongyang, as shown in the map. For its part, Jinmen Daeo, 250 kilometers
from Taiwan but less than ten from mainland China, was originally in a weaker
position than Baekryong, but Taiwan was able to transform it into a strategic
fortress that defended itself against 470,000 artillery shells fired on it from 23 August to 5 October 1958. It is now a tourist site, governed by its people.16 If Seoul
is able to do the same with Baekryong and the other West Sea Islands, they will
deter North Korean violations of the NLL and, if necessary, threaten the North’s
middle region. Moreover, the islands will compel the North to reposition frontal
forces to the rear areas, in effect deterring North Korean threats of turning Seoul
into a sea of flames.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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Responses to Special Operations (Light Infantry) Threats
North Korea is known to possess superior irregular-warfare capabilities (specialoperation, mountain, night, and depth-infiltration warfare, etc.) and to combine
them effectively with regular-warfare tactics. Moreover, it has recently greatly increased its light infantry units;17 intelligence shows that the North has increased its
special warfare force to approximately two hundred thousand men, apparently intended to execute guerrilla-type depth infiltration warfare by exploiting the weaknesses of high-tech forces in mountainous regions. In order to counter such asymmetric threats, the South must consider two measures—defensive and offensive.
With regard to defensive counter-asymmetric measures in this area, the ROK
must develop night-surveillance, reconnaissance, and identification equipment,
along with night-targeting and precision-strike weapons, in order to “light up the
night.” Scientists have noted that current technology is sufficient for this purpose.
Moreover, with aerial surveillance and reinforcement and unmanned air reconnaissance methods, as well as helicopter-based mobility and strike, the ROK will
be able to “flatten the mountains.” Considering the lack of resources, the South
should strongly consider prioritizing aerial methods and decreasing procurement of tanks and other ground mobility and strike forces.
Next, the ROK must bolster its mobile reserves and homeland defense systems. As previously stated, the South must actively prepare against rear infiltration by the North’s frontal units by upgrading various reserve divisions to match
the standards of standing forces. The South must establish a counter-infiltration
operation system, with a combined effort from civil society, government, and
the military, to improve major current vulnerabilities. This system would review
countermeasures and strengthen weaknesses against not only ground but also
underground, aerial, and sea/underwater infiltration. The South should especially apply lessons learned from the ROKS Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island shelling incidents and prepare forces and operational concepts to effectively counter
underwater infiltration attempts, and, moreover, develop its capabilities against
submarines as well as against small, high-speed, stealth patrol killers. The ROK
forces must perceive North Korean infiltration capabilities as asymmetric assets
no less dangerous than WMDs, and should continuously review, supplement,
and develop counter-infiltration measures (policy, strategy, doctrine, weapons/
equipment, organization, exercises, support, etc.) in various aspects at a joint operational level.
The ROK can also sharply improve its own depth-infiltration special-operation
capabilities by capitalizing on the strengths of a “net-centric operational environment” (NCOE). Today, most advanced military powers are actively utilizing
the nonlinear decentralization capabilities offered by NCOE for unconventional
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warfare. NCOE has continuously expanded the purpose and range of special operations at a strategic level, by virtue of the ability it gives units to be deployed in
enemy territory and carry out their missions while maintaining close network connections with friendly forces and rear services.18 These special operation forces will
not only become a strategic liability to the North itself but also restrain and deter
enemy infiltration attempts and play an indispensable role in achieving victory in
war. An organic combination of NCOE, “blitz” warfare by regular ground and air
forces, and special forces could produce a counter-asymmetric force far superior to
North Korea’s regular-irregular/mixed-warfare tactics.19
Responses to Cyberwarfare Threats
North Korea’s cyberwarfare should not be ignored. The North perceives cyberwarfare tactics to be as important as WMDs and has concentrated on their development.20 The regime selects young students of ages twelve and thirteen, enrolls them in computer courses for the gifted at the First and Second Geumseong
Senior-Middle Schools, and then matriculates them in either Kim Il-sung University or the Command Automation University (formerly known as Mirim University) after graduation. The Command Automation University selects around a hundred talented students for an intensive five-year course and then sends graduates to
cyber-related institutions and military units. Also, as illustrated in table 2, the
121st Unit, originally under the Korean People’s Army General Staff Reconnaissance Bureau, was reorganized in 2008 into technical reconnaissance teams, with a
mission that includes infiltrating computer networks, hacking secret information,
and planting viruses to paralyze enemy networks. Other such organizations—the
204th Unit, under the Operations Department of the Unification Bureau, and the
Psychological Operations Department of the North Korea Defense Commission
—are primarily focused on cyber-psychological warfare.
North Korea is known to operate and manage directly websites—for instance,
The North Korea Official Page, in collaboration with pro-North and civil organizations within the South—that execute psychological warfare and organized
espionage.21 According to a report submitted to parliament by the National Police
Agency in September 2008, the agency had by that date blocked forty-two foreignbased, pro-North websites out of a total of seventy-two that propagandize juche
ideology and the North’s unique socialist state while at the same time inciting
anti-South and anti-American sentiments. North Korea has also utilized websites
operated by sympathizing parties in order to initiate espionage. By the end of
2008 North Korea possessed twenty-four websites, including “Gugukjeonseon”
(구국전선), and the numbers continue to increase. Recently, pro-North civil organizations digitized posters and leaflets used in the 1980s by activist students
and uploaded them to their websites, where they have been highly effective.22
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TABLE 2
CYBER- AND CYBER-PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE UNIT
Institution/Unit

Composition

Mission and Activities

121st Unit (Intelligence Bureau)

Approx. 300 persons,
10 combat teams,
110 research teams

Hacking, virus-planting in military units related to
cyberwarfare

Central Party
Investigative Group

Approx. 500 persons,
10 technical teams

Technical education and training

Unification Bureau
Operations Department

50 persons

Cyber-psychological warfare, organizational
espionage

204th Unit
(Operations Department, of the
Unification Bureau)

Approx. 100 persons,
5 espionage teams

Cyber-psychological warfare planning, execution,
and research on techniques and technology

The South’s security will be seriously threatened should it lose the battle to
control cyberspace. However, it has not been easy to devise innovative counterstrategies, because of the special conditions of cyberspace and the substantial investment and effort required. The best policy available at this point is, first, to
upgrade, as a strategic matter, the ROK Cyber Command, established in early
2010. This command will open the way for cooperation among existing national
cyberwarfare institutions and for collaboration in new policies and connections.
It can also formulate a system that will enable cyberwarfare operations led by the
military in time of war; connect and conduct integrated intelligence and regular
operations; and design an overall cyberwarfare structure, including the concepts,
doctrine, requirements, education, and training methods needed for the command to operate effectively.
Countermeasures at the government level are also necessary. The Republic of
Korea is an information-technology powerhouse. Its world-class “cyber geniuses,” technological abilities, investment capital, and infrastructure make it asymmetrically superior to the North. The problem lies with the government’s lack of
effort and will to organize and systemize such potential for effective use in the
field of national security. It is urgent that we resolve such an ironic contradiction.
At a policy level, solutions may include establishing norms for the cyber realm,
obliging real-name usage, creating a cyber “shinmungo” (신문고, a big drum
that was struck by petitioners against the government during the Joseon dynasty,
1392–1897) to allow the people to report suspicious activities, formulating a voluntary cyber reserve force and a mobile civil-defense unit, commending regions
that have greatly contributed to cyber protection, and holding cyber-protection
technology competitions.
Furthermore, the ROK must establish and strengthen legal and systematic devices that can block North Korea’s unusual cyber-infiltration tactics and sever its
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connections with sympathizers within the South. Although it is important that
the government protect its citizens’ freedom in cyberspace, irresponsible, antisocial, and antinational behavior must be constrained. Cyberspace has now become
the fifth battlefield, where an important “nonwar” must be fought and victory
won through a “minimal damage” strategy.23
Responses to High-Technology Threats
Along with its nuclear weapons and missiles, North Korea is also developing
high technology relevant to conventional weapons. Electromagnetic-pulse, GPSdisturbance, stealth technologies represent a few of its latest asymmetric programs
intended to offset the South’s developing NCW forces by targeting its weaknesses.
The 2008 ROK national defense white paper stressed that North Korea has
developed various GPS-disturbance and deception devices and was contemplating measures against precision-guided weapons.24 It has been discovered that the
North attempted to export to Iran, Syria, and other Middle East nations GPSdisturbance devices that can jam high-tech missiles and precision-guided bombs;
in May 2010, ROK government officials discovered in a North Korean weapon
export catalogue information indicating that the CHT-02D, the type of torpedo
that sank ROKS Cheonan, contained a GPS-disturbance device.
The situation may further deteriorate if North Korean jamming devices are,
or will be, able to affect the ROK’s precision-guided weapons, such as the Joint
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), its wind-corrected munition dispenser, and
other systems intended to counter long-range artillery threats against Greater
Seoul.25 In the second Gulf War in 2003, there were cases in which the Iraqi army
deployed Russian GPS-disturbance devices against U.S. precision-guided weapons, resulting in ineffectual explosions. The National Defense and Science Institute has reportedly invested a great deal of ROK currency—more than forty billion won—over the past six years to develop a Korean guided-glide weapon, the
Korean GPS-Guided Bomb, which is known to perform better than JDAM.26 Its
range is from seventy to a hundred kilometers (JDAM’s current range is twenty
kilometers) and can accurately target underground LRA tunnels with entrances
less than three meters across (ten meters for JDAM) from a safe distance. The successful development of the Korean GPS-Guided Bomb is indeed good news and
will greatly contribute to national security, but adequate countermeasures against
North Korean GPS jamming are still pending and continue to require scientific
and technological effort.
A recent article stated that North Korea has developed and employed stealth and
camouflage technologies.27 It reported that an exclusively obtained, eighty-page
North Korean military manual on electronic warfare explained various camouflage
and deception methods in detail, such as that radar-wave-absorption paint of 1.4
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to 1.8 mm thickness achieves a wave-absorption rate of 95 percent for three to five
years. This manual suggests that anti-wave and anti-infrared paint has been applied
to the entrances of LRA tunnels, obtaining an absorption rate of 99.8 percent of
radio waves and 99.9 percent of infrared. Further, the manual is reported as stating that fake tunnel entrances have been created about 150 to 300 meters away
from the real ones, with nearby angled reflectors to draw enemy radar. The manual
also includes graphs that analyze differences in facility concealment from various
distances and heights (such as the twelve-kilometer flight altitude of the U.S. Army’s RC-135 and ROK Army’s Hawk 800XP) and suggests that the ROK’s groundsurveillance radars deployed in the frontal region can be deceived by walking at less
than one kilometer per hour at five-meter intervals.
North Korea has also developed small stealth submarines. In May 2005, Iran
publicly announced the production of its first domestically produced submarine,
“a craft capable of operating stealthily.”28 Witnesses have judged that this submarine, which the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics calls
Ghadir, is similar in appearance to the North Korean Yugo (유고) class; other experts believe that Ghadir is about 50 percent longer than the Yugo class and therefore is more like the North Korean Sang-o (상어, “Shark”) class. On 8 August
2010, Agence France-Presse and the Associated Press reported that the Iranian
navy had launched four domestically produced small submarines, of the “Ghadi
[sic]” class, that were based on the North Korean Yeon-o (연어, “Salmon”) type,
and possessed stealth features enabling them to evade sonar and sonobuoys.29
The Persian Gulf is shallow, with an average depth of twenty-five meters and a
maximum of 170. The West Sea (or Yellow Sea, west of the Korean Peninsula) has
an average depth of forty-five meters and a maximum of a hundred. This similarity of numbers, against the background of the torpedoing of ROKS Cheonan,
seems profoundly significant. Bruce Bechtol, an American expert on the Korean
Peninsula, has stated that “North Korean Yugo-class submarines may become a
potential threat to the South in the West Sea area since they are able to operate
in shallow waters” and that “the North Korean submarines provided to Iran are
most likely Yugo class.”30 From such opinions and statements of experts, we can
surmise that the Iranian Ghadir submarine is based on the same prototype as
North Korea’s newly developed submarine that operates off the Nampo Naval
Base in the West Sea.
A TURNING POINT
Despite its severe economic crisis, the North has managed to develop nuclear weapons and missile technologies and conduct pioneering research on the
means to counter the South’s network-centric warfare assets. The North has
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astutely selected and concentrated on low-cost weapons and assets that can
effectively penetrate the South. A strategy to counter these asymmetric threats
is needed, and the answer is to both develop high-tech NCW assets and maintain superiority in counterstealth, counter-submarine, counterelectronic, and
counter-cyberwarfare capabilities. The Republic of Korea possesses all the resources and capabilities required. What the ROK needs, and urgently, is an understanding of its situation and a collective will to solve its problems and push
forward with its plans.
Today, the two nations on the Korean Peninsula compete under different ideologies, government systems, and strategies. South Korea, with its superior national power, strives to achieve an asymmetric superiority based on high-tech,
networked forces, assets of superior quality, and a robust alliance with the United
States—its core asymmetric factor. Meanwhile, the North, in severe economic
crisis and suffering the effects of a hereditary dictatorship, pursues quantitative
superiority along with a focus on nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction,
as well as on tactical asymmetric measures that exploit the South’s weaknesses.
Until now, the North has consistently aspired to achieve an armed reunification of the two Koreas. However, against South Korea, a nation boasting a thriving economy thirty times greater than its own and a superpower ally, the North
had no choice but to complement its conventional warfare doctrine with asymmetric concepts. The North Korean underground tunnels, tunnel bases, mixed
warfare, infiltration tactics, long-range artillery, nuclear weapons, CBR weapons,
missiles, GPS disturbance, stealth, small submarines (like that which torpedoed
ROKS Cheonan), and other assets yet unknown are all examples of the North’s
asymmetric strategy and methods.
Our ancestors applied the “porcupine strategy,” “yiyijaeyi,” and “yisojaedae” as
examples of what we now call asymmetric strategies. The great commander Admiral Yi Sun Shin invented the “turtle ship” and the “crane wing formation” and
employed them successfully in battle during the Japanese invasions of 1592 and
1597.31 As his proud descendants, it is time for the citizens of the Republic of Korea to shift to a new paradigm, reassess the strengths and weaknesses of their national defense, and develop counter-asymmetry strategies against the North. Like
the attacks of 9/11 against the United States, the tragic sinking of ROKS Cheonan
and the shelling of Yeonpyong Island must together mark a turning point in the
history of the South’s national defense.
The policy directions suggested here call for an increase in the national defense
budget, the cooperation and coordination of the people, and determination in
the political sphere. The words of the Roman strategist Vegetius, Si vis pacem,
para bellum—should you desire peace, prepare for war—are still valid today.
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NOTES

The opinions in this article are the personal
views of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the policies and strategies of the ROK
Ministry of National Defense, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, armed forces, or government. Additionally, this article does not reflect the position
of the U.S. government.
1. North Korea’s torpedoing of ROKS Cheonan
and bombarding of Yeonpyeong Island can
be understood as efforts to create achievements for Kim Jung-eun (the apparent prospective successor to Kim Jong-il); to induce
direct, bilateral North Korean–U.S. talks and
resumption of Six Party Talks; and to elicit
support from China. See 조성율 [Cho Seung
Ryul], “북한의 연평도 포격도발 및 한반
도 미래 전망” [Intentions behind North
Korea’s Bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island
and Future Prospects on the Korean Peninsula] (a paper presented at Korea Institute for
Maritime Strategy [KIMS]–Research Institute for Maritime Strategy [RIMS] seminar, 9
December 2010, Seoul), pp. 9–14.
2. At this writing it is expected that North
Korea will complete a base for hovercraft
and stealth air-cushion warships at Koampo,
Hwanghae Province, only fifty kilometers
from the South’s northwestern islands, in
December 2011. See “Stealth Hovercraft
Armada Poised to Invade South Korea,” 31
May 2011, available at www.lucianne.com/;
and 윤성원 [Yoon Sung Won], “NLL 인접
북한 고암포 해군기지 완공 단계” [Construction of Koampo Naval Base near NLL
Nearing Completion], 29 May 2011, available
at www.asiatoday.com.kr/.
3. 이윤규 [Lee Yoon Kyu], “북한의 사이버 심
리전 실체와 대응방안” [The Essence of
North Korea’s Cyber-Psychological Warfare
and Appropriate Counter-measures], 육
군 [The Army, monthly magazine], August
2009, pp. 1–6. North Korea pursues a hybrid
concept involving preemptive surprise attacks and lightning, combined-arms warfare
combining regular and irregular forces,
cyber- and psychological warfare, terrorism,
etc., to offset its technological inferiority
against conventional ROK-U.S. forces.
4. “Juche” [주체], or the “juche ideology” [주
체사상], is an ideology of national “selfreliance,” developed in the Kim Il-sung era
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and now used as the theoretical foundation
of the regime; see www.globalsecurity.org/,
s.v. “Juche [주체, Self-Reliance or SelfDependence].”
5. 남만권 [Nam Man Kwon], “최근 화생무기
현안의 문제점과 우리의 과제” [Current
Issues and Tasks on the Latest CBR Weapons], Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
Weekly, 29 May 2000.
6. In 2010, according to a comparison of flight
time, South Korean fighter pilots flew about
140 hours and North Korean pilots less than
ten.
7. Song Sang-ho, “ROKS Cheonan Sinking
Reshapes Military Strategies,” Korea Herald,
21 March 2011, pp. 4 and 15.
8. 변창섭 [Chang Sup Byun] and Bruce
Bechtol, “북한, 기존의 국가체제론 변화
어렵다” [Change Expected to Be Difficult
for North Korea under Current Regime],
내가 보는 북한-30 [My View of North
Korea–30], Radio Free Asia, 11 August 2010,
available at www.rfa.org/. They offered
several reasons for North Korea’s nuclear
program. First, because North Korea can
attain high military status by possessing
nuclear weapons, Kim Jong-il is developing them as a means to maintain his own
power. Second, they argue, the North Korean
regime is believed to have received at least
two billion dollars from Syria for plutonium,
and a substantial amount of diesel fuel as
well as petroleum from Iran for cooperating
with that nation’s highly enriched uranium
program. Lastly, North Korea desires highly
enriched uranium and plutonium weapons
as a deterrent or offensive weapon against
the ROK-U.S. alliance and Japan.
9. National plans refer to required core assets in
terms of stages. The first stage is surveillance
and control, including multipurpose satellites, high-altitude unmanned reconnaissance
aircraft (Global Hawk), early-warning radar
for ballistic guided missiles, early-warning
control aircraft (E-737), and a combined
firepower-employment system (JOFOS-K).
The second is precision strike: combined
long-range attack missiles (JASSM), direct
precision missiles (JDAM), and bunker busters (BGU-28). The third stage, interception,
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involves air-defense missile control centers
(ADM-Cell), surface interception guided
missiles (SM-6), and ground-based Patriot
missiles (PAC-II/III). The fourth stage is
nuclear protection: EMP defense systems and
individual/unit defenses.
10. 유용원 [Yoo Yong Won], “북한군 비밀교범
단독입수: 북한 위장 전술, 레이저 전파
까지 흡수한다” [Exclusive Obtainment of
Confidential North Korean Military Manual:
North Korean Camouflage Tactics Able to
Absorb Radar Waves], 조선일보 [Chosun
Ilbo], 23 August 2010, available at news
.chosun.com/. Recently, North Korea has
developed and deployed enhanced Scud
missiles, along with the new KN-01 groundto-surface missile and KN-02 ground-toground missile. Replacing the outdated
Chinese Silkworm (with a range of 83–95
kilometers and vacuum-tube circuitry), the
KN-01 ranges 120–160 kilometers and has
improved accuracy. The short-range (120
kilometers) KN-02 uses solid fuel, is mobile,
has an accuracy (circular error probable) of a
hundred to two hundred meters, and can be
launched within five minutes.
11. 권태영 [Kwon Tae Young] and 노훈 [Roh
Hoon], 21세기 군사혁신과 미래전 [21st
Century Military Reform and Future Warfare] (Seoul: 법문사 [Beobmusa], 2008), pp.
361–62.
12. The ROK Ministry of National Defense
(MND), 한국적 군사혁신의 비전과 방책
[Visions and Measures of Korean Military
Reforms] (Seoul: ROK MND, 2003), p. 30. In
2030, South Korea’s economy is expected to
be placed among the “G7” industrialized nations and its information index to enter the
“G5” (meaning advanced countries in terms
of information technology, including the
United States, Japan, the People’s Republic of
China, and the EU).
13. 김정익 [Kim Jung Ik], “미래 합동작전에
서 지상군의 중심적 역할” [The Central
Role of Ground Forces in Future Combined
Operations], in Korea Research Institute for
Strategy (KRIS), 2008년 육군전투발전: 대
전환기 정예화 선진육군의 비전과 전략
[2008 Army Combat Development: Visions
and Strategies for an Advanced Elite Army
during Times of Transition] (Seoul: KRIS,
September 2008), pp. 491–92 and 525.
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14. As shown in the map, the five islands are
Baekryong Do, Daechung Do, Sochung Do,
Yeonpyeong Do, and Woo Do. “Do” [도]
means “island” (for example, Yeonpyeong Do
is Yeonpyeong Island).
15. Jung Sung-ki, “S. Korean Navy to Boost Precision Weapons and Surveillance Aircraft,”
Defense News, 10 January 2011, pp. 11–12.
16. On the second Taiwan Strait crisis and Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu) Islands,
see “Second Taiwan Strait Crisis Quemoy and
Matsu Islands 12 August 1958–01 January
1959,” available at www.globalsecurity.org/.
17. North Korea has reorganized its frontal
corps structure, increasing its light infantry
divisions and elevating infantry battalions to
regiments.
18. This tactic involves employment of special
units against strategic targets deep in enemy
territory to radiate them with directedenergy weapons and target them with longrange precision weapons launched from
the land, sea, and air. Success requires high
confidence of air supremacy and real-time
precision strike support.
19. 권태영 [Kwon Tae Young], 육군비전 2030
연구 [Research on Army Vision 2030 Research] (Seoul: KRIS, November 2009), pp.
298–302.
20. On 7 July 2009 and 4 March 2011, South
Korea and the United States suffered concentrated DDOS cyber attacks; because North
Korea was identified as the source of these
attacks, experts began to reevaluate North
Korea’s cyberwarfare capabilities. North
Korea currently operates technical reconnaissance teams consisting of approximately
a thousand members under the People’s
Army General Staff Reconnaissance Bureau;
professional North Korean hackers have usually been placed in China, from where they
continuously attempt to hack the internet
sites of major South Korean government
institutions.
21. The North Korea Official Page, available at
www.korea-dpr.com; Gugukjeonseon [구국
전선], available at www.ndfsk.dynds.org.
22. Lee, “The Essence of North Korea’s CyberPsychological Warfare and Appropriate
Counter-measures.”
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23. Conventionally speaking, first-generation
warfare is the destruction of enemy forces in
nearby areas through concentrated fires (e.g.,
the Napoleonic Wars); second-generation
warfare is the destruction of enemy forces located farther away through concentrated fires
(i.e., artillery) (e.g., the First World War);
and third-generation warfare is characterized
by short-term manuever battles involving
“shock and awe” tactics. Fourth-generation
warfare is political conflict in which available
asymmetric tools of warfare are utilized to
defeat the enemy resolve to carry on the fight
(e.g., Mao Zedong’s People’s War against
the Kuomintang, the Vietnam War, etc.). In
the fifth generation, attacks are launched to
weaken enemy soft power. For more details,
Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small
Wars,” World Politics 27, no. 2 (January
1975), pp. 175–200; New Military Paradigm,
제4세대전쟁 [Fourth-Generation Warfare]
(Seoul: 집문당 [Jimmundang], 2010); 전종
순 [Jun Chong Soon], “전쟁없는 전쟁: 제
4세대전쟁” [Fourth Generation: Warfare
without Warfare], 군사연구 [Military History Studies], no. 125 (August 2008); and 양
욱 [Yang Wook], “제4세대 전쟁: 한국의 대
비책은?” [Fourth-Generation Warfare: What
Is the ROK’s Preparation?], 시사저널 [Sisa
Journal], no. 1108 (12 January 2011), available at www.sisapress.com/.
24. ROK MND, Defense White Paper 2008 (Seoul:
ROK MND, 2008), p. 27.
25. “북한 장사정포대에 대한 공격은 GPS 방
해시 어렵다” [Precision Strike of North Korean Long-Range Artillery May Be Difficult
When GPS Is Disrupted], 16 October 2006,
available at www.dailynk.com/; 고광섭 [Ko
Kwang Sup], “만약 한국의 GPS 항해 신호
가 불가능하게 된다면” [If It Becomes Impossible to Use GPS Navigation Signals], 국
방일보 [Kookbang Ilbo], 10 October 2008.
North Korea has attempted to export its
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27. Yoo, “Exclusive Obtainment of Confidential
North Korean Military Manual.”
28. 김필재 [Kim Pil Jae], “북한과 이란의 슈퍼
어뢰를 가진 스텔스 잠수함 협력” [North
Korea–Iran Connections Regarding Stealth
Submarine Super Torpedoes], Independence
Newspaper, 6 April 2010.
29. 이인묵 [Lee In Muk], “이란, 북한기술도입
해 새로운 잠수함 완성” [Iran Completed
New Submarine with North Korean Technology], 조선일보 [Chosun Ilbo], 9 August
2010, available at news.chosun.com/.
30. “북한 어뢰의 남한 해군함정 폭침” [North
Korea Torpedo Sinks South’s Navy Ship], DemocracyForums, May 2010, available at www
.democracyforums.com/.
31. For the turtle ship, see the cover illustration
and caption of the Spring 2010 Naval War
College Review and, for the Japanese invasion,
Yoji Koda, “The Emerging Republic of Korea
Navy: A Japanese Perspective,” in the same
issue (pp. 13–34).

20

12/5/2011 11:30:40 AM

